“Possession” of Woodland Property to Maintain Adverse Possession Action
Duncan v. Chartiers Nature Conservancy, 2023 WL 5698631 (Pa. Super.) (unreported), allocatur granted Mar. 12, 2024, appeal docket 8 WAP 2024
Jack and Jeffrey Duncan (the Duncans) filed a complaint against Chartiers Nature Conservancy, Inc. (Conservancy) to quiet title by adverse possession of two parcels of land (the Property). Superior Court summarized the relevant background as follows:
The Duncans “have been or are the owners of certain property located in the Borough of Crafton, Allegheny County, designated as Lot 105-H-200” (the Duncan Property). (Second Amended Complaint, at ¶ 3). On April 1, 2016, the Conservancy obtained a deed from the Artingers for Lot 105-M-202 (hereinafter the Artinger Lot) and it obtained a quit claim deed from PNC bank for Lot 105-M-198 (hereinafter the PNC Lot) on May 25, 2000. (collectively, Property). On January 2, 2020, the Duncans filed a second amended complaint to quiet title by adverse possession of the Artinger Lot and the PNC Lot.
The Duncans averred that “[f]or more than 40 years, since 1977 [they] have been in open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, uninterrupted adverse possession of [the Artinger and PNC Lots] and have used them exclusively in their business” “of sorting, shredding, blending and selling soil, gravel and fill materials as well as storing tools and equipment” to the exclusion of all other parties. (Id. at ¶¶ 9, 11). According to the second amended complaint, the Conservancy “has not entered onto the properties nor attempted to exclude or eject the [Duncans] from [the Lots].” (Id. at ¶ 10).
The second amended complaint averred that the Duncans “are entitled to a judgment quieting title in them, declaring them as the sole owners of the [the Property] by adverse possession” “[a]s a result of the [their] continued, uninterrupted and exclusive use of the premises to work on the sorting, blending, storing and shredding of soil and gravel into fill material and storing tools and equipment[.]” (Id. at ¶ 11).
Slip op. at 2-3. The Conservancy filed preliminary objections, arguing that the Property was unenclosed woodlands and the Duncans did not establish adverse possession of them. The Duncans countered that they sufficiently pleaded an action to quiet title by adverse possession in the complaint, and that the evidence established that the Duncans were in actual possession of the Property. The trial court found the Duncans possessed the Property, “because they exercised dominion over the subject property by erecting gates limiting access to the Property,” and ordered the Conservancy to file an action in ejectment pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1061(b)(1) (providing that a quiet title action may be brought “to compel an adverse party to commence an action of ejectment”). Slip op. at 5. The Conservancy appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the Duncans had possession under the common understanding of that term rather than the more technical definition applicable to “enclosed woodlands.” The Conservancy further contended that the trial court abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law in finding that possession had been shown because the legal presumption that the Conservancy possessed the Property was not overcome where the trial court found that possession was “‘less than clear or … plaintiffs were in possession of at least a portion of both parcels[.]’” Slip. op at 12, quoting trial ct. op. at 6.
Superior Court agreed with the trial court that “whether the property is enclosed woodlands does not go to whether the Duncans had requisite possession for jurisdictional purposes but rather goes to what is needed to make out a claim of adverse possession,” reasoning:
Whether a person is in possession determines the form of the action and the relief that can be granted. If a plaintiff is in possession, a court could not order a defendant ejected from the property, even if the property was considered woodland; that would result in ordering the defendant to file an action in ejectment. That is why it is improper for the trial court to make any finding in the quiet title action other than whether the plaintiff is possession, a necessary finding to order defendant to file an ejectment action. See Roberts v. Est. of Pursley, 700 A.2d 475, 481 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). Because whether the property was enclosed woodlands does not go to whether the Duncans had possession but whether they can make out a claim of adverse possession, the trial court did not err in applying the ordinary definition of possession.
Slip op. at 11-12. Superior Court held that the Duncans established by competent evidence for jurisdictional purposes to maintain a cause of action to quiet title, concluding:
At the core of the Conservancy’s argument is that the court should not have relied on the Duncans’ evidence and that we should reweigh the evidence in their favor. What that ignores is that it is within the trial court’s exclusive purview to accept or reject any evidence. See Voracek v. Crown Castle USA, Inc., 907 A.2d 1105, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2006). It also ignores that we cannot reweigh the evidence on appeal. See Stephan, 100 A.3d at 664-65. Of course, when the merits of the Duncans’ adverse possession claim are heard, the trial court is free to make new findings based on a full hearing that takes place after pleadings are closed and then apply the applicable adverse possession standard.
Slip op. at 12-13.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court will consider the following issues:
May a trial court decline to apply the presumption of law that one who holds title to real estate “possesses” such real estate where the court expressly finds that possession of the real estate at issue “was less than clear or shared by both parties” and that both competing parties were in possession of “at least a portion” of such real property?
Where the law prescribes how a party “possesses” unenclosed woodland property in the context of an action to quiet title, may a trial court expressly ignore such legal definition and apply instead only “the common understanding” of that word to determine whether the court has the obligatory subject matter jurisdiction in the first instance?