Are worker’s compensation specific loss benefits are payable following an injured worker’s death resulting from a work injury?
Steets v. Celebration Fireworks (WCAB), 295 A.3d 312 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), allocatur granted Jan. 16, 2024, appeal docket 3 MAP 2024
In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will consider whether worker’s compensation specific loss benefits are payable following an injured worker’s death resulting from a work injury.
Commonwealth Court summarized the relevant factual background as follows:
On June 30, 2017, while working for Celebration Fireworks, Inc. (Employer), an explosion occurred when Claimant inserted a fuse into a fireworks display causing her traumatic injuries. On March 13, 2018, Employer filed a Notice of Compensation Payable accepting liability for Claimant’s injuries, and paid Claimant temporary total disability benefits.
Claimant filed the Claim and Review Petitions seeking to define the nature and extent of her injuries, alleging therein that the loss of use injury was an injury separate and apart from the brain injury. Employer opposed both Petitions. After several hearings, by October 7, 2019 order, the WCJ granted the Claim and Review Petitions and amended Claimant’s work injuries to include “multiple body parts amputation, traumatic brain injury/anoxic encephalopathy with significant cognitive impairment, septic shock, respiratory failure, dysphagia, quadriparesis, bowel and bladder incontinence, and loss of use of both arms.” See Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 235a. Relevant here, the WCJ found that Claimant lost the use of her arms for all practical intents and purposes, and that the impairment was permanent. The WCJ declared that once Claimant’s total disability benefits ceased, Claimant would be entitled to specific loss benefits under Section 306(c)(3) and (25) of the WC Act (Act). Employer appealed to the Board. On October 8, 2020, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s decision. See R.R. at 245a. On November 5, 2020, Employer appealed to this Court.
On November 28, 2020, Claimant died as a result of complications from bilateral pneumonia caused by her work-related respiratory deficiency. See R.R. at 85a. Employer ceased payment of total disability benefits upon Claimant’s death. On May 24, 2021, this Court affirmed the Board’s October 8, 2020 order. See Kemps v. Steets (Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd.), 257 A.3d 1271 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Steets I) (wherein this Court concluded that substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s determination that Claimant lost the use of both her arms for all practical intents and purposes, and Claimant was entitled to specific loss benefits after total disability benefits ceased).
On March 31, 2021, Claimant’s estate (Estate) filed the Claim, Review, and Penalty Petitions, seeking (1) payment of Claimant’s funeral expenses, (2) payment of Claimant’s specific loss benefits, and (3) penalties based upon Employer’s failure to pay the previously awarded specific loss benefits. On December 15, 2021, the WCJ granted the Claim Petition – ordering Employer to pay Claimant’s funeral expenses – and dismissed the Review and Penalty Petitions. The Estate appealed to the Board, which, on April 26, 2022, affirmed the WCJ’s decision.
Slip op. at 2-3. The estate appealed to Commonwealth Court.
Commonwealth Court summarized the relevant statutory provisions and precedent as follows:
Under the Act, an employer is liable for WC benefits where a claimant “establish[es]: (1) [s]he was injured while in the course of employment, and (2) the injury resulted in a loss of earning power.” Bryn Mawr Landscaping Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cruz-Tenorio), 219 A.3d 1244, 1252-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). Under Section 306(a)(1) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 511(1), “[w]here an employee is totally disabled, meaning that the injury results in a total loss of earning power for a period of time, . . . she is entitled to receive [total disability] benefits until the disability ceases.” City of Erie, 838 A.2d at 602-03 (footnote omitted).
Section 306(c) of the Act also provides a schedule to compensate injured employees for permanent losses. See 77 P.S. § 513. Because “specific loss benefits are recognized as compensation ‘for the loss of use of designated bodily members rather than for general loss of earning power,’ ” they “are payable without regard to whether the permanent injury has actually caused a wage loss.” Allegheny Power Serv. Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Cockroft), 954 A.2d 692, 702 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (quoting Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 479 Pa. 618, 389 A.2d 42, 43 (1978)).
Moreover,
[i]t is well established that in matters involving specific loss claims, a claimant who sustains an injury that is compensable under Section 306(c) of the Act … (relative to specific loss calculations), is not [also] entitled to compensation beyond that specified in that section[,] even though [she/]he may be totally disabled by the injury.
Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Easterling), 113 A.3d 909, 914 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Sharon Steel Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Frantz), 790 A.2d 1084, 1088 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)). This occurs because “[i]njuries, including those that result in a loss of earning power, that normally flow from the specific loss injuries are considered compensated under specific loss benefits.” Lindemuth v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Strishock Coal Co.), 134 A.3d 111, 121 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).
However, “[a]n exception to the general rule provides that a claimant may also receive benefits for injuries that are separate and distinct from those that flow from the specific loss injury.” Steets I, 257 A.3d at 1277. Thus, where, as here, “if a claimant suffers an injury that is separate and apart from a specific loss of a body part that results in a loss of earning power, a claimant may receive compensation under Section 306(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 511[ ] (related to total disability) …, in addition to benefits for the specific loss of a body part.” Lindemuth, 134 A.3d at 121. In such case, Section 306(d) of the Act declares that “the number of weeks for which compensation is specified for the [specific loss] shall begin at the end of the period of temporary total disability which results from the other separate injuries[.]” 77 P.S. § 513(d); see also Coker v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Duquesne Light Co.), 856 A.2d 257, 261 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (Where a single work-related incident has caused multiple, separate and distinct injuries, payment of specific loss benefits does not begin until after the claimant’s receipt of total disability payments ends.).
Generally,
[u]nder Section 307 of the Act, … when a claimant receiving temporary total disability benefits dies from work-related causes, her death creates an independent right for [widowers, and/or] surviving children[/dependents] to claim survivors’ benefits. The Act prescribes the computation and recipients of the survivors’ benefits, which are obtainable by filing a fatal claim petition …. [See] 77 P.S. § 561[.]
Kinzler, Tr. for Kinzler v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Ass’n for Vascular Access), 245 A.3d 389, 398 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (citation omitted). Section 307(7) of the Act adds that when an employee without dependents dies as a result of his/her work injury, the employer shall pay up to $7,000.00 in reasonable burial expenses. See 77 P.S. § 561(7).
“The survivability of specific loss benefits is treated separately in the Act.” Est. of Harris v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sunoco, Inc.), 845 A.2d 239, 243 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). Section 306(g) of the Act provides, in relevant part:
Should the employe die from some other cause than the injury, payments of compensation to which the deceased would have been entitled to under [S]ection 306(c)(1) to (25) [of the Act] shall be paid to … persons who at the time of the death of the deceased were dependents …:
….
(7) If there be no dependents eligible to receive payments under this section[,] then the payments shall be made to the estate of the deceased but in an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided in this [A]ct ….
77 P.S. § 541 (emphasis added).
In addition, Section 410 of the Act states, in pertinent part: “In case any claimant shall die before the final adjudication of his[/her] claim, the amount of compensation due such claimant to the date of death shall be paid to the dependents entitled to compensation, or, if there be no dependents, then to the estate of the decedent.” 77 P.S. § 751. In Estate of Harris, this Court expressly ruled that “[Section 410 of the Act] does not provide an independent or supporting basis for a specific loss award ….” Id. at 243 (quoting Endres v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Phila.), 677 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (emphasis added)).
Slip op. at 4-7. Commonwealth Court held that the estate was not entitled to payment of specific loss benefits awarded to but not collected by a claimant prior to her death from work-related injuries, reasoning that:
…the Estate asserts that since the practical effect of Estate of Harris is “to … provide greater benefits to workers who die from non-work-related causes than those whose injuries ultimately cause their death[,]” which is inconsistent with the Act and its humanitarian purposes and the principles of statutory construction, this Court should clarify Estate of Harris, and apply its holding only to situations in which an injured worker dies from a cause other than a work-related injury, while still permitting the estates of injured workers who die as a result of their work-related injuries to receive previously awarded specific loss benefits. Employer Br. at 9.
While this case is certainly tragic, the instant appeal is not the vehicle for this Court to revisit or reinterpret Estate of Harris. The Estate has failed to identify any legal basis consistent with the Act’s express language for this Court to do so. Estate of Harris is precedential. “Stare decisis ‘maintains that for purposes of certainty and stability in the law, a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same.’ ” Bold v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 285 A.3d 970, 979 n.9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stilp v. Commonwealth, 588 Pa. 539, 905 A.2d 918, 966-67 (2006)). The circumstances presented to this Court in Estate of Harris are nearly identical to those now before the Court. Harris sustained work-related injuries for which the employer paid her total disability benefits until her death due to her work-related injuries. Because Harris died without statutory dependents, the estate paid her funeral expenses. The Estate of Harris Court thoroughly examined Endres, Burns International, and City of Scranton v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Rideski), 536 Pa. 161, 638 A.2d 944 (1994), in reaching its decision, which was consistent with this Court’s interpretations of Sections 306(c)-(d), 306(g) and 307 of the Act, and upheld the WCJ’s decision that the estate was only entitled to statutory funeral expenses. Thus, Estate of Harris is not distinguishable on its facts or the law.
This Court acknowledges that “[w]hile stare decisis serves invaluable and salutary principles, it is not an inexorable command to be followed blindly when such adherence leads to perpetuating error.” Stilp, 905 A.2d at 967. However, Estate of Harris does not perpetuate any error. Legal scholars have observed:
The Act is to be “liberally construed, with borderline interpretations resolved in favor of the injured employe.” [Turner, 389 A.2d at 47.] … [I]t may seem at first blush that an outcome that results in less compensation to a worker who dies from a work-related injury than to a worker who dies from some other cause would be contrary to a “liberal” construction of the Act.
However, … the language of the Act yields a clear result[,] and, although [Estate of] Harris may be a case of first impression, it is resolvable with respect to the language of the Act. Moreover, the outcome in [Estate of] Harris does not run afoul of the remedial purpose of the Act.
Th[e Estate of Harris C]ourt’s application of [S]ection 306(g) [of the Act] closely tracks the language of the statute. Given the facts, it was difficult for the [e]state [therein] to formulate an intellectually coherent way to surmount the [ ] requirements of [S]ection 306(g) [of the Act]. Accordingly, [Estate of] Harris was really decided on the facts and did not present a difficult case of statutory interpretation. Therefore, [Estate of] Harris did not present a “borderline interpretation [ ] [to be] resolved in favor of the injured employee.”
Moreover, the outcome in [Estate of] Harris did not infringe on the remedial purpose of the Act. The provision for the survival of the specific loss election for dependents in [S]ection 306(g) [of the Act] is intended to protect dependents where an injured worker dies of a cause other than the work-related injury.
The survival provision in [S]ection 306(g) [of the Act] is augmented by a death benefit for dependents in cases where the injured worker dies of a work-related injury. Therefore, whether the worker dies of the work-related injury or some other cause, a benefit or advantage is preserved for the statutory dependents. Accordingly, at least with respect to dependents, the [Estate of] Harris decision does not fail to achieve the remedial purpose of the Act.
…. [T]he Act’s more generous treatment of dependents is not irrational and may reflect an effort to balance the cost of the [WC] program with the protection of those most vulnerable to the harm occasioned by work-related injuries. Moreover, should it be necessary or desirable to harmonize the treatment of dependents and non-dependents under the Act, the legislature would be in the best position to do so because it is the more politically accountable branch.
Yen T. Lucas, Est. of Harris v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sunoco, Inc. & Esis/Signa): Survival of Specific Loss Claims, 15 Widener L.J. 519, 528-30 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
The General Assembly stated its intention in Section 306(g) of the Act, and, despite this Court’s rulings in Endres (in 1996) and Estate of Harris (in 2004), to date, the General Assembly has not taken steps to change its effect.
It is a well[-]established principle of statutory interpretation that [courts] “may not supply omissions in the statute when it appears that the matter may have been intentionally omitted.” Sivick v. State Ethics Comm[’]n, [662 Pa. 283,] 238 A.3d 1250, 1264 (2020). It is not [the courts’] role under our tripartite system of governance to engage in judicial legislation and to rewrite a statute in order to supply terms which are not present therein[.]
In re Nov. 3, 2020 Gen. Election, 662 Pa. 718, 240 A.3d 591, 611 (2020) (emphasis added); see also Lower Swatara Twp. v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd., 208 A.3d 521, 529 n.12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (quoting Bender v. Pa. Ins. Dep’t, 893 A.2d 161, 164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (“Th[is C]ourt may not rewrite a statute[.]”); Mercurio v. Allegheny Cnty. Redevelopment Auth., 839 A.2d 1196, 1203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (quoting Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 240, 482 A.2d 1148, 1161 (1984) (“It is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to rule on the wisdom of legislative enactments. ‘The judiciary may not sit as a super legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations ….’ ”).
Slip op. at 11-15.
In dissent, Judge Ceisler would conclude that Section 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act) authorizes the payment of specific loss benefits following the work-related death of a claimant, explaining that:
Section 410 of the Act relevantly provides that, if a claimant dies before the final adjudication of her claim, the amount of compensation due “to the date of death shall be paid” to the claimant’s dependents or, in the absence of dependents, to the claimant’s estate. 77 P.S. § 751 (emphasis added). The language in Section 410 does not condition the payment of compensation upon a specific cause of death. This Court reviewed Section 410 in White v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Good Shepherd Rehabilitation Hospital), 666 A.2d 1128 (Pa. 1995), in which a claimant’s estate sought payment of total disability benefits owed at the time of her death. A workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) denied the claim, reasoning that Section 410 “applies only to specific loss claims and death claims.” Id. at 1129. Although we affirmed the WCJ on other grounds, we agreed with the claimant’s estate that “Section 410’s scheme of distribution applies to all claims regardless of the nature of the loss[,]” including specific loss benefits, fatal claims, and total disability benefits. Id. at 1130 (emphasis added).
Instantly, at the time Steets died, Celebration Fireworks, Inc.’s (Employer) challenge to a WCJ’s award of specific loss benefits was pending before this Court. Therefore, Steets died prior to a final adjudication of her claim for specific loss benefits. Per Section 306(d) of the Act, specific loss benefits are not paid until a claimant’s period of total disability has ended. Specific loss benefits are not intended to compensate a claimant for loss of earning power; rather, such benefits are intended to specifically compensate a claimant for the loss of use of a designated body part, rather than for the general loss of earning power. Shaffer v. Workmen’s Comp Appeal Bd. (Silver & Silver, Inc), 138 Pa.Cmwlth. 624, 588 A.2d 1029, 1032-33 (1991). The relevant language in Section 410 only becomes operable following a claimant’s death and, unlike Section 306(g). As noted herein, Section 410 does not distinguish between a work-related death or one that is wholly unrelated to the work injury. Therefore, under Section 410, if a claimant dies prior to final adjudication of a claim, whatever the cause, the claimant’s dependents or estate “shall be paid” the amount of compensation due “to the date of death[,]” regardless of the nature of the loss. 77 P.S. § 751; White, 666 A.2d at 1130.
Slip op. at EC-1 – EC-3. Finding Estate of Harris “readily distinguishable from the instant matter,” Judge Ceisler concluded:
Unlike Steets, the claimant in Estate of Harris, Rosalie Harris (Harris), had not been awarded specific loss benefits at the time she died, nor had she filed a claim petition seeking specific loss benefits. This Court recognized that, if Harris had died before her final total disability payment was made, her employer would be required to make the payment by operation of Section 410. Further, although we acknowledged that the “dependent of a deceased employee” could elect to receive specific loss benefits in lieu of total disability, we rejected the argument that Harris’ estate should be permitted to make such an election on her behalf. Id. at 243. We noted that Section 410 of the Act generally provides for the payment of benefits owed to a claimant who dies prior to the final adjudication of his or her claim. Id. Section 410 does not, however, “provide an independent or supporting basis for a specific loss award[.]” Id. at 243 (emphasis in original) (quoting Endres v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd. (City of Philadelphia), 677 A.2d 901, 903 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)). In effect, because Harris was not awarded specific loss benefits prior to her death, the issue of whether previously-awarded specific loss benefits could survive the work-related death of a claimant was not before this Court.
Slip op. at EC-4 – EC-5.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur as to the following issue:
Because specific loss benefits are not payable until either disability ceases or the worker dies, did [the] Commonwealth Court err by limiting receipt of specific loss benefits posthumously to only claimants who die because of a cause unrelated to the work injury?
For more information, contact Kevin McKeon or Dennis Whitaker.