Compensation for Specific Loss under Section 306 of the Workers’ Compensation Act
Jackiw v. Soft Pretzel Franchise (WCAB), 2023 WL 5122153 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (unreported), allocatur granted Feb. 14, 2024, appeal docket 3 EAP 2024
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to consider whether Section 306(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 511, rather than Section 306(c), 77 P.S. § 513, applies to determine the benefit rate for the specific loss of a body part. Commonwealth Court summarized the relevant statutory provisions at issue as follows:
Section 306(a) provides that in cases of total disability, an employee may be compensated “sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of [her AWW] beginning after the seventh day of total disability, and payable for the duration of total disability[.]” Section 306(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 511. This compensation may not be more than the statewide AWW. See id.6 Further, if the benefit calculated is less than fifty percent of the statewide AWW, then Section 306(a) defines a remedial calculation, i.e., “the benefit payable shall be … ninety per centum of the worker’s [AWW].” Id.
Section 306(c) of the Act sets out the schedule of compensation for disability relating to specific loss, i.e., permanent injuries of certain classes. See Section 306(c) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 513(1)-(25). For example, an employee who suffers the loss of a forearm shall receive “sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of [her AWW] during three hundred seventy weeks.” 77 P.S. § 513(2). This section also requires that compensation shall not be more than the statewide AWW nor less than 50 percent thereof but provides no remedial calculation. 77 P.S. § 513(25). In other words, where the standard calculation for compensation for disability relating to specific loss results in an amount less than 50 percent of the statewide AWW, the Act does not require, for example, that the employee receive 90 percent of her AWW. Compare Section 306(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 511, with Section 306(c)(25), 77 P.S. § 513(25).
Slip op. at 4-5.
This case arises from a work injury resulting in an arm amputation suffered by Jackiw, an employee of Soft Pretzel Franchise (Employer). Following the Employer’s notice of compensation, Jackiw filed a a penalty petition alleging a violation of the Act based on that fact that her injury had resulted in a specific loss of a forearm pursuant to Section 306(c)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The parties stipulated that Jackiw’s injury was a specific loss of the forearm under Section 306(c)(2) of the Act and that she was entitled to 370 weeks of compensation and a healing period of 20 weeks, but the parties could not agree whether the specific loss benefit rate should be calculated under Section 306(a) or Section 306(c) of the Act and submitted the issue to the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). The WCJ determined that Jackiw’s benefits were to be calculated pursuant to Section 306(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and concluded that the legislature did not intend to treat a claimant receiving specific loss benefits differently from a claimant receiving total disability benefits. In so finding, the WCJ relied on Walton v. Cooper Hosiery Co., 409 A.2d 518 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), which Commonwealth summarized as follows:
This difference between Section 306(a) and Section 306(c) was at issue before the Walton Court. In that case, the claimant had suffered the permanent loss of his left eye and was entitled to 275 weeks of specific loss benefits plus 10 weeks’ healing period pursuant to Section 306(c) of the Act. See Walton, 409 A.2d at 520. However, the parties could not agree whether Section 306(a) or Section 306(c) controlled the correct rate of specific loss benefits. See id. Considering various amendments to the Act promulgated by the General Assembly in 1974, the Walton Court determined that the legislature had intended to harmonize these provisions.8 See id. at 520-21 (noting, inter alia, that the changes made to subsection (c) “conform[ed] precisely to the changes made in subsection (a)”). Accordingly, because the standard calculation for specific loss benefits resulted in compensation less than fifty percent of the statewide AWW, the Walton Court applied the remedial calculation defined in Section 306(a) and awarded the claimant ninety percent of his wages. Id. at 521.
Slip op. at 5-6. Jackiw appealed to Commonwealth Court, requesting that the court reconsider Walton and offered the following arguments:
First, Claimant contends that the Walton Court erred because it relied on the “personal” AWW of a claimant in calculating specific loss benefits and that term appears nowhere in the statutory language of the Act. See id. at 7, 9-16. Claimant traces the history of this Court’s use of the term to Johnson v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 327 A.2d 222 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974), superseded by statute as stated in Walton, 409 A.2d 518, which was decided prior to the 1974 amendments. See id.
Second, Claimant maintains that the legislature recognized that different categories of disability required separate schedules of compensation. See id. at 16-20 (distinguishing, e.g., claims for wage loss occasioned by total disability, the permanent amputation of a body part, and death). Therefore, discerning no ambiguity in this statutory language, Claimant contends that she is entitled to rely on the plain language of the Act and the particular schedule of benefits defined in Section 306(c). See id. Further, noting the absence of any defined remedial calculation, Claimant asserts that she is entitled to no less than the minimum defined in Section 306(c)(25), i.e., no less than 50 percent of the statewide AWW. See id. at 16-20.
Slip op. at 6-7. The Employer countered that the WCJ was correct to rely on Walton as controlling precedent.
Commonwealth Court declined to revisit Walton and affirmed the WCJ, concluding that:
…we reject Claimant’s request that we award her compensation based on her interpretation of the plain language of the statute. As we have stated repeatedly, in passing the 1974 amendments, it was the intention of the legislature to harmonize the benefits payable to claimants and eliminate potential disparity among similarly situated claimants. See [Walton] at 521; see also Arnold, 110 A.3d at 1074; Cockroft, 954 A.2d at 700 n.11; Carney, 546 A.2d at 154. It is a foundational principle of the workers’ compensation system that a claimant benefits from the expeditious payment of compensation, as well as the surety of receiving that payment, in exchange for forgoing recovery of some elements of damages—namely, higher payments. See Tooey, 81 A.3d at 860. In that sense, the Walton Court’s decision aligns with the purpose of the Act: treating claimants under both Section 306(a) and Section 306(c) equally, even where it may mean lower payments.
This Court has indeed addressed and used the Walton interpretations throughout the years, and despite her tragic injury, Claimant simply has not provided a compelling reason to set aside 40 years of precedent. See Pries, 903 A.2d at 144. Claimant has not met her burden of showing that the WCJ or the Board committed an error of law in following it. See Bryn Mawr Landscaping Co., 219 A.3d at 1252 n.5.
Slip op. at 9-10.
Judge Wojcik, joined by President Judge Cohn Jubelirer and Judge Wallace, dissented, finding that departure from stare decisis was warranted here because, in his view, Walton was wrongly decided in that “the Court did not follow the fundamental tenants of statutory construction in reaching its conclusion.” Slip op. at MHW-5. The dissent explained:
The plain language of Section 306(c)(25) evinces the General Assembly’s intent to treat workers who suffered permanent loss of a body part differently than workers with a total disability. Such an interpretation gives meaning to both Section 306(a) and 306(c), whereas the Walton analysis eliminated the distinction between wage loss under Section 306(a) and scheduled loss under Section 306(c), thereby rendering Section 306(c)(25) essentially meaningless. There is no ambiguity in the statutory language to justify the Walton’s Court disregard of the plain language in pursuit of its spirit. Even if we look beyond the plain language and considered other considerations of legislative intent, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that the General Assembly intended to compensate claimants who suffer a specific loss more than claimants who suffered total disability without the loss of a body part. Claimants under Section 306(a) and claimants under Section 306(c) are not similarly situated. Though both may be totally disabled, claimants eligible for benefits under Section 306(c) suffered a permanent specific loss, not just a disability.
Slip op. at MHW-6 – MHW-7. The dissent concluded:
In sum, there can be little doubt that Claimant in this case, having suffered a work-related loss of her forearm, has suffered a more grievous injury than a claimant who has not lost a body part. Based on the plain language of Section 306(c), the General Assembly clearly intended to compensate claimants with specific loss more generously than other claimants. In Walton, this Court distorted and frustrated the clear intention of the General Assembly by disregarding the plain language of the Act.
Slip op. at MHW-9.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to consider:
Did the Commonwealth Court err in applying Section 306(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 511, rather than Section 306(c), 77 P.S. § 513, to determine the benefit rate for the specific loss of a body part, based upon its decision in Walton v. Cooper Hosiery Co., 48 Pa.Cmwlth. 284, 409 A.2d 518 (1980)?
For more information, contact Kevin McKeon or Dennis Whitaker.