Prima Facie Showing Required to Support Unsworn Falsification to Authorities, Tampering with Evidence, Tampering with Public Records, and Obstructing the Administration of Law
Commonwealth v. Williams, 302 A.3d 1238 (Pa. Super. 2023), allocatur granted Mar. 26, 2024, appeal docket 17 EAP 2024
In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will consider whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case brought against a former police detective for unsworn falsification to authorities, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, tampering with public records or information, and obstructing administration of law or other governmental functions.
A person commits the crime of unsworn falsification to authorities “if, with intent to mislead a public servant in performing his official function, he: (1) makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be true[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904(a)(1). A person commits tampering with or fabricating physical evidence where the person, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted:
(1) alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with intent to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation; or
(2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to be false and with intent to mislead a public servant who is or may be engaged in such proceeding.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1)-(2). The relevant statutory provision prohibiting Tampering with Public Records or Information provides that a person commits the offense if one “knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any record, document or thing belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for information or record, or required by law to be kept by others for information of the government[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4911(a)(1). The crime of obstructing administration of law or other governmental functions occurs when a person “intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function by … breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act”:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act, except that this section does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions.
18 Pa.C.S. § 5101.
Superior Court summarized the relevant factual background as follows:
In November 2019, the Commonwealth charged Nathaniel Williams, a former Philadelphia Police Detective, with the above-mentioned crimes, which related to allegations that Williams had conducted searches of law enforcement databases using a license plate number and provided information he obtained from the searches to his cousin. In September 2020, the court held the first of the two preliminary hearings that were held in this case, and dismissed all charges. The Commonwealth filed a Notice of Refiling of Criminal Complaint, listing charges of tampering with public records, obstruction of administration of law/other government function, unsworn falsification, tampering with/fabricating physical evidence. The court held a second preliminary hearing that incorporated the testimony from the first and allowed into evidence a transcription of a police interview of Williams and certain phone records. The following is a summary of the evidence from the two hearings.
The prosecution presented the testimony of the owner of the car to which the license plate number pertained, Theresa Williams, and the investigating officer, Lieutenant James Clough. Theresa3 testified that in October 2017, Edwin Williams approached her in the parking lot of a Michaels craft store and asked for her phone number. N.T., 9/11/2020, at 6, 8. Theresa informed him she was not interested. She got in her car, and as she went to back up, she saw Edwin pull his car behind hers and sit there. Id. at 8. Theresa “felt like he was doing something behind [her] car.” Id. Theresa said that a week or two later, she was at home and heard a knock on the door, and saw Edwin at the door. Id. at 9. When she opened it, she “asked him how the hell he found [her].” Id. at 10. He would not leave, so she had him write his phone number on a piece of paper. Id. She stated that a couple days later, she went to the SEPTA police department to file a report. Id. at 10-11. She testified she went to SEPTA because during one of their encounters Edwin had told her he worked for SEPTA. Id. at 9, 20, 22. She further testified that in the days following his appearance at her home, Edwin left roses and cards on her car. Id. at 14.
Lieutenant Clough, with the Internal Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police Department, testified that he received Theresa’s complaint and investigated. Id. at 57. He stated that the investigation revealed that on October 17, 2017, Williams ran a search for Theresa’s license plate number through national and state databases – NCIC and PCIC5 – and conducted a voter registration check. Id. at 59, 61-62. Lieutenant Clough also interviewed Williams. Id. at 77.
During the interview, Williams stated that he ran Theresa’s license plate in connection with a homicide investigation. He said he had seen a suspect in the homicide investigation get into a vehicle a few months before, and when he found what he believed was the vehicle the following day, he “ran that tag.” N.T., 4/22/2021, at 35. He did “[a]ll kinds of cross checks,” as follow ups, including “car stops, 48-A’s, voters, real estate, criminal history, property ownership, and social media.” Id. at 36.
Williams further stated that Edwin was his cousin and, when asked the last time he had last spoken with Edwin, he stated, “I am not sure; maybe a year or more.” Id. Williams further said he did not disseminate information related to Theresa’s license plate or other records to Edwin. Id. at 39-41. Lieutenant Clough testified that Williams signed each page of the interview. Id. at 29.
Lieutenant Clough testified that after the interview, he proceeded to the homicide division and procured a homicide file he needed in the investigation of Williams’ searches regarding Theresa. N.T., 9/11/2020, at 77. He collected one folder, which he reviewed and found no reference to Theresa. Id. at 78. He stated that the following day, Williams called and informed the Internal Affairs Division that there was a second folder for the homicide investigation. Id. Lieutenant Clough testified he retrieved that folder and when reviewing it found “several references to [Theresa] which included a Facebook photograph, a photograph of [Theresa] and her children that was printed from Facebook,” and handwritten notes on the back, with Theresa’s name, “no record/no wants, 75-48A negative, no friends shared, autism supporter, the abbreviation for possibly, p-o-s-s and neighbors.” Id. at 78-79. It also had Theresa’s license plate number and some biographical information. Id. at 79. He stated the folder contained no other references to Theresa and for “[a] lot of the inquiries” made during the investigation and included in the file, “there [were] copies, there [were] printouts of various license plates, tags, houses that were checked. And this was the only one, the only thing that was not printed out, it was just handwritten on the back of a Facebook page.” Id. at 79-80. The Commonwealth did not admit any part of the homicide file into evidence.
The Commonwealth also put into evidence phone records showing text messages between Williams and Edwin, and phone calls before and after Edwin’s first encounter with Theresa. The material showed text messages from the day of the encounter, October 14, as well as October 15, and October 17, the day Williams conducted the NCIC and PCIC searches. Id. at 87-88. Further, on November 24, 2017, the day the police interviewed Edwin, Williams replaced his phone. Id. at 88. The Commonwealth did not have the actual content of the text messages. Id.
Slip op. at 1-5. The trial court found the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate the elements of the crimes by a preponderance of the evidence and denied the Commonwealth’s motion to re-file. The Commonwealth appealed to Superior Court, and a three-judge panel of this Court affirmed; however, Superior Court granted reargument and withdrew the prior memorandum.
Following reargument, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court and held that the Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case for each of the crimes alleged – unsworn falsification to authorities, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, tampering with public records or information, and obstruction of the administration of law or other governmental function. As to unsworn falsification to authorities, Superior Court rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that Williams made a written statement when he signed the transcript of the interview that Lieutenant Clough transcribed, concluding that:
The Internal Affairs interview, which was conducted as an oral interview, memorialized in writing by Lieutenant Clough, and signed by Williams, does not constitute a “written false statement,” under the statute. Cf. Commonwealth v. Gaithers, 13 Pa.D&C.3d 668, 671 (Pa. C.P. Montg. 1978) (defendant convicted of making an unsworn falsification to police officer where defendant gave a false identity during an interview and signed her false name on the interrogation form).
Slip op. at 8-9. Next, Superior Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing the Tampering with Physical Evidence charge, reasoning that:
The Commonwealth failed to present prima facie evidence that the information regarding Theresa was added to the file after Williams learned of the Internal Affairs Division’s investigation. Rather, the IAD detective merely testified he retrieved the file, and the prosecution presented no testimony from anyone that he obtained the entire file when he initially procured it. That the second file was not included with the first is not evidence, even at a prima facie level, that the material was added after Williams learned of the investigation.
Slip op. at 11. Superior Court also rejected the Commonwealth’s challenge to the dismissal of the Tampering with Public Records or Information charge as based on speculation, reasoning that:
The homicide file is a “public record or thing,” as contemplated by the statute, as it is kept by the government and is something that police officers are required to compile. In [Commonwealth v. Barger, 375 A.2d 756, 763-64 (Pa. Super. 1977)], this Court found that a police accident report was a public record. We pointed out the all-inclusive language of the statute, and that the report was kept by the police who were required to distribute it to specified individuals and agencies.
In Clites [v. Upper Yoder Township, 485 A.2d 724 (Pa. 1984)], relied on by Williams, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found a police officer could not be disciplined for destroying logbooks. In doing so, it found the Board of Supervisors “erred in concluding that [the] appellant’s destruction of the old log books constituted a violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4911.” 485 A.2d at 727 n.5. It reasoned there was no evidence “concerning the nature of the log books” that “impl[ied] a duty to keep them for future use.” Id. at 727. It pointed out the logbooks were like diaries and “there was no evidence that the books contained any information that was essential to the legal recordkeeping requirements of a police department” and there were separate records kept for arrests. Id. Here, the homicide file is more akin to the accident report in Barger than the logbooks in Clites.
Nonetheless, the Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case that Williams made a false entry or alteration to the file. As a homicide detective working on the investigation, he added his own notes and computer printouts to the file.
The Commonwealth’s assertion that Williams “falsified” the second file is mere supposition and speculation. There is nothing of record to show that such was the case. The Commonwealth failed to adduce prima facie evidence of tampering with a public record.
Slip op. at 14-15 As to the final charge, Obstructing the Administration of Law or Other Governmental Functions, Superior Court found that “[l]ying during the Internal Affairs interview cannot be the basis of an obstruction charge, as mere lying during an interview, without more, does not constitute a violation of any codified crime or civil statute. It therefore is not an ‘unlawful act.’” Slip op. at 17. Superior Court reasoned:
In Commonwealth v. Shelly, the defendant was convicted of obstructing administration of law after the trial court found his providing a false name to police officers constituted an “unlawful act.” 703 A.2d 499, 503 (Pa.Super. 1997). We reversed because “no statute … criminalizes ‘mere lying’ in response to police questioning,” and the obstruction statute – Section 5101 – did not “fill this gap.” Id. at 504. We reasoned that although the Crimes Code enumerates offenses where “falsity is punishable,” each provision contained elements not in the obstruction statute. Id. We pointed out that statutes making it a crime to give false information to police included other elements, such as having the intent to implicate someone else in the crime. See id. at 504 n.6. We concluded that, as there were sections dealing with falsity to police, “we cannot presume the legislature’s failure to include this most common scenario to be the result of a desire to penalize it in the ‘catchall’ of section 5101.” Id. at 504.
We conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing the obstruction charge. Lying during the Internal Affairs interview cannot be the basis of an obstruction charge, as mere lying during an interview, without more, does not constitute a violation of any codified crime or civil statute. It therefore is not an “unlawful act.” See id. Although Shelly’s holding that providing false identification to law enforcement is not a crime has been superseded by statute, that does not undermine its central holding that the “unlawful act” element of Section 5101 can only be satisfied by allegations setting forth a violation of codified law. The allegation that Williams added information to the homicide file – a file that he would use to conduct the investigation – cannot constitute “any other unlawful act.”
Moreover, because the Commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case for the other crimes charged, those charges do not meet the “any other unlawful act” catchall provision. Although the Commonwealth maintains the alleged addition to the homicide file was a breach of official duty, it has provided no legal authority to support this claim, and we are aware of none.
Slip op. at 16-17.
Dissenting, Judge Olson and joined by Judges Bender, Stabile, and Dubow, would find that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to hold Williams for court on all charges. The dissent opined that the majority erred in holding the Commonwealth to “a more stringent standard; i.e. the Commonwealth is required to disprove or rebut interpretations of the evidence that favor Appellee, even when the evidence presented provides for a reasonable inference that a crime was committed and that Appellee was the person who probably committed the crime.” Dissent slip op. at 2. As to unsworn falsification to authorities, the dissent would find that the interview transcript is a “written statement,” explaining:
There is nothing in the language of the statute that requires the defendant to be the actual scrivener of the written statement at issue. Lieutenant Clough contemporaneously transcribed Appellee’s oral statements provided during the interview. Appellee adopted the entire transcription by signing all six pages and attesting to the fact that the “foregoing statement” was “true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.” N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 4/22/21, at 44-45. These acknowledgements and attestations make the statement Appellee’s own. There is no reason why an individual would not be liable under Section 4904(a) for attesting to the truth of a written statement that was memorialized by a third party. In fact, it is commonplace for signatories to affidavits prepared by third parties to be subject to the penalties prescribed by Section 4904. See e.g., 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 102 (definition of “affidavit” in the Judicial Code, including “an unsworn document containing statement of fact and a statement by the signatory that it is made subject to the penalties of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4094.”).
Moreover, this Court previously affirmed a conviction under Section 4904(a) where a false written statement was memorialized by a third party and then adopted by the way of the defendant’s signature. In Commonwealth v. Cherpes, 360 Pa.Super. 246, 520 A.2d 439 (1987), the defendant served as the chairman of a local municipality’s board of commissioners. As such, he was required by law to file financial disclosure statements. The defendant filed a financial disclosure statement that failed to disclose certain income that he received through his insurance business. He claimed that he was out of town when the statement was due; therefore, his wife completed as well as signed the form. During trial, evidence was presented that the signature was, in fact, the defendant’s signature. Although the form was completed by the defendant’s wife, the jury found the defendant guilty of violating Section 4904(a). On appeal, this Court held that, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth, the jury properly convicted the defendant of unsworn falsification.
Dissent slip op. at 12-13. Thus, the dissent would conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to maintain this charge based on the record, which “reflects that [Williams] gave a false written statement to Lieutenant Clough with an intent to mislead.” Id. at 17. As to tampering with physical evidence charge, the dissent would find sufficient evidence exists to establish a prima facie case “that Appellee altered the homicide file by creating a second folder with Ms. Williams’ photograph and personal information to mislead and thwart an official investigation.” Id. at 20. The dissent would further find that the Commonwealth Court made a prima facie case to support the tampering with public records charge, opining that:
When viewing this evidence and all reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, I believe that it is more likely than not that Appellee used official computer systems to help Edwin locate Ms. Williams then tried to cover it up by manipulating a government record to make it appear as if Ms. Williams were involved in a murder investigation. Appellee acted intentionally to create a second folder as part of the M17-185 homicide investigation file to deceive Lieutenant Clough and mislead him to believe that his purpose for accessing these systems was legitimate. I acknowledge that Appellee gave an innocent explanation for his actions; however, it is not proper at this stage of the proceedings to rely on Appellee’s self-serving statements and completely disregard the evidence that reasonably leads to the conclusion that Appellee tampered with public records in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4911(a).
Dissent slip op. at 24. Finally, the dissent would find that the Commonwealth established a prima facie case of obstructing the administration of law, reasoning that:
The Majority concludes that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of establishing a prima facie case on the obstruction charge as the Commonwealth did not establish a prima facie case for the other crimes charged. I set forth in detail why the record compels a finding that the Commonwealth met its burden of establishing a prima facie case that Appellee violated Sections 4904(a) (unsworn falsification), 4910 (tampering with or fabricating physical evidence) and 4911 (tampering with public records) of the Crimes Code. Since there is no question that Lieutenant Clough was engaged in the administration of a governmental function while investigating Appellee, all of the elements of Section 5101 were met. Therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the charge of obstruction.
Dissent slip op. at 25.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur as to the following issues:
(1) Did the Superior Court err in holding that a signed and initialed transcription of a police interview is not a “written statement” for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of unsworn falsification to authorities under 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904?
(2) Did the Superior Court err in holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of obstructing administration of law or other governmental function under 18 Pa.C.S. § 5101?
(3) In holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, 18 Pa.C.S.§ 4910, and tampering with public records or information, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4911, did the Superior Court fail to evaluate the evidence under the correct standard of review?
For more information, contact Kevin McKeon or Dennis Whitaker.