Is an attorney affidavit sufficient competent evidence to meet the threshold showing of potential prejudice needed to warrant an evidentiary hearing regarding potential juror influence?
Commonwealth v. Jeter, 296 A.3d 1187 (Pa. Super. 2023), allocatur granted Feb. 21, 2024, appeal docket 4 WAP 2024
Sheldon Devont Jeter (Appellant) was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. Jeter filed a post-sentence motion seeking an evidentiary hearing to determine whether “prejudicial information not of record and beyond common knowledge and experience was improperly brought to the jury’s attention” or whether “an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror.” Slip op. at 5. Superior Court summarized the Jeter’s post-sentence motion as follows:
Within Appellant’s post-sentence motion, Appellant noted that he “had previously been widely publicly reported as a person of interest in the extremely high-profile investigation of the 2018 homicide of Rachel DelTondo, one of the most infamous crimes in Beaver County’s history, and, in fact, reports regarding [the case at bar] referenced [Appellant’s] status in that regard.” Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 8/20/21, at 3. According to Appellant, after his trial concluded, he learned that “Juror Number 3 and her now-estranged husband [ ] lived with her parents next door to the [DelTondo] crime scene and were actually present when” Rachel DelTondo was murdered. Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). Appellant further learned that, “at the time of the DelTondo homicide, Juror Number 3’s husband viewed DelTondo’s corpse, which contributed to his development of post-traumatic stress disorder, which in turn contributed to Juror Number 3’s and [her husband’s] estrangement and divorce.” Id.
With this backdrop, Appellant claimed that, after the jury was discharged, he learned of two instances where potentially extraneous information might have been communicated to the jurors or where an outside influence might have been improperly brought to bear upon a juror. See id. at 3-10. First, Appellant attached an affidavit from a local attorney and trial spectator named Jodi Gill (hereinafter “Attorney Gill”), where she averred:
during [a sidebar at Appellant’s trial,] there were two women spectators who … were talking very loudly about … the Rachel DelTondo case … [and] were speaking so loudly that the [court reporter transcribing witness testimony at Appellant’s trial] … had to tell them to stop talking in front of the jurors.
Affidavit of Attorney Gill, 7/19/21, at 1-3.
Second, Appellant attached an affidavit from his attorney, Alexis Cobb (hereinafter “Attorney Cobb”), where she averred that she spoke with the former father-in-law of Juror Number 3. As Attorney Cobb averred, Juror Number 3’s former father-in-law told her that he spoke with Juror Number 3’s father (hereinafter “Juror Number 3’s Father”). According to the former father-in-law, he learned from Juror Number 3’s Father that Juror Number 3 and Juror Number 3’s Father “talked about the case during the jury deliberations and that [Juror Number 3] was having a hard time deciding what to do and that [Juror Number 3] and [Juror Number 3’s Father] ‘prayed on it’ and after they prayed, [Juror Number 3] made her decision.” Affidavit of Attorney Cobb, 7/19/21, at 1-2.
Appellant requested that the trial court hold an evidentiary hearing, where it could receive juror testimony and determine whether any of the jurors received extraneous information or were subjected to outside influence and, if so, determine whether Appellant is entitled to a new trial. See Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion, 8/20/21, at 10.
Slip op. at 5-8. The trial court denied the motion without conducting a hearing. Jeter appealed to Superior Court, contending that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to hold an evidentiary hearing to investigate his claim that Juror Number 3 received extraneous information or was subjected to an outside influence, when Juror Number 3 talked to her father about Jeter’s case.
Superior Court vacated the trial court’s denial of Jeter’s post-sentence motion and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to examine the substance and surrounding circumstances of the discussion between Juror Number 3 and Juror Number 3’s Father, when they “talked about the case during the jury deliberations.” Slip op. at 21, quoting Affidavit of Attorney Cobb. Superior Court reasoned:
… under Pratt [v. St. Christopher’s Hosp., 581 Pa. 524, 866 A.2d 313, 324 (2005)], the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing on this issue, as Appellant’s factual allegations satisfy the threshold showing of potential prejudice.
Here, Attorney Cobb’s affidavit unequivocally alleges that Juror Number 3 “talked about the case” with her father. Affidavit of Attorney Cobb, 7/19/21, at 2. Further, the allegations in the affidavit imply: that Juror Number 3 discussed the case with her father because she was “having a hard time deciding” how to vote; that the two discussed the specific facts of Appellant’s case; that the discussion revolved around the “central issue in the case” (i.e. Appellant’s guilt or innocence); and that, after discussing the case with her father, Juror Number 3 decided to vote guilty. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 457 Pa. 237, 324 A.2d 350 (1974) (“[a] criminal defendant who is tried before a jury can only be convicted by unanimous verdict”); see also Pratt, 866 A.2d at 323 (looking to the “implication[s]” of Juror 10’s allegations to determine whether a hearing was warranted); Carter, 604 A.2d at 1016-1017 (“[i]n determining the reasonable likelihood of prejudice, the trial judge should consider … whether the extraneous influence relates to a central issue in the case or merely involves a collateral issue”). These circumstances satisfy the threshold showing of potential prejudice and warrant further investigation to determine whether Juror Number 3’s Father provided Juror Number 3 with “prejudicial information not of record and beyond common knowledge and experience” or improperly brought to bear an outside influence upon her. See Pa.R.E. 606(b)(2). Thus, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant’s request for an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
It is true that Attorney Cobb’s affidavit does not reveal the substance of Juror Number 3’s discussion with her father and it does not allege that Juror Number 3’s Father supplied Juror Number 3 with prejudicial information or subjected Juror Number 3 to outside influence. Further, Attorney Cobb’s affidavit is based upon layers of hearsay. Nevertheless, in Pratt, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to hold an evidentiary hearing on its juror misconduct claim, despite similar deficiencies. Indeed, in Pratt, the allegations of juror misconduct were contained in an unsworn letter and based upon hearsay. Further, in Pratt, the allegations of juror misconduct were “not specific in terms of whether the extra-record information allegedly communicated to jurors was favorable or unfavorable to” the movants and the letter did not specifically declare whether the extra-record information in the civil case “was received by majority or minority jurors.” See Pratt, 866 A.2d at 322-323. Finally (and echoing Pratt), given the confidential and protected nature of the jury deliberation process, it does not strike us as unusual that claims involving the introduction of extraneous information or outside influence begin as generalized declarations passed between and among jurors, family members, courtroom participants, and onlookers. See id. at 323 (noting that the Supreme Court “has discouraged pointed, post-verdict discussions between disappointed litigants and discharged jurors that are specifically directed toward collecting evidence with which to impeach the verdict”). Thus, in following Pratt, we conclude that the deficiencies in Attorney Cobb’s affidavit do not preclude an evidentiary hearing in this case.
Slip op. at 27-29. Superior Court concluded:
we must vacate the trial court’s order of November 22, 2021 denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion and remand the case, to enable the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing and determine: whether or not Juror Number 3 and her father “talked about the case during the jury deliberations;” the circumstances surrounding the alleged communications; the substance of what Juror Number 3 and Juror Number 3’s Father discussed, when they “talked about the case during the jury deliberations;” and, the prejudicial impact of any such extraneous information or outside influence by applying the “objective test for prejudice as well as the associated guidelines that [were] set forth in the lead opinion in Carter, 604 A.2d at 1016-1017.” Pratt, 866 A.2d at 324; see also Pope, 14 A.3d at 145-147.
Slip op. at 29-30.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to consider:
Did the Superior Court err in ruling that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the affidavit of Attorney Alexis Cobb did not contain sufficient competent evidence to meet the threshold showing of potential prejudice needed to warrant an evidentiary hearing?